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Abstract	
Recent accidents of commercial airplanes have raised the question once more 
whether pilots can rely on automation in order to fly advanced aircraft safely. 
Although the issue of human-machine interaction in aviation has been investi-
gated frequently, profound knowledge about pilots’ perceptions and attitudes is 
fragmentary and partly out-dated. The paper at hand presents the results of a 
pilot survey, which has been guided by a collaborative perspective of human-
automation decision-making. It puts emphasis on the hybrid interaction of 
human actors and non-human technical agents and the role distribution in the 
digital cockpit. The key question is whether pilots have confidence in human-
automation collaboration, even in the case of automated systems, which act 
more and more autonomously. 
The results are partly surprising: confidence in hybrid collaboration is rather 
high, depending mostly on perceived symmetry of humans and automation as 
well as on perceived change of competencies and role distribution. The percep-
tion of complexity is only average, and – most unexpected – this factor does 
not negatively affect pilots’ confidence in hybrid collaboration. The differences 
between Airbus and Boeing pilots are much lower than assumed, but pilots of 
regional jets, mostly flying short- or medium-range aircraft, differ from both 
groups remarkably, presumably due to their specific task profile, including a 
high number of opportunities to collaborate with automation. 
Keywords	
aviation automation, human-machine interaction, confidence, complexity, sur-
vey  
  
Zusammenfassung	
Können Piloten noch fliegen? 
Rollenverteilung und hybride Interaktion in hochautomatisierten 
Flugzeugen  
Eine Reihe von Flugzeugunfällen in der Zivilluftfahrt der letzten Jahre hat die 
Debatte wiederbelebt, ob Piloten, die computergestützte Flugzeuge fliegen, 
sich auf die automatischen Systeme verlassen können. Trotz einer Vielzahl von 
Studien zur Mensch-Maschine-Interaktion der Luftfahrt ist unser Wissen über 
die Wahrnehmungen und Einstellungen von Piloten fragmentarisch und teil-
weise veraltet. Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt die Ergebnisse einer Pilotenbefra-
gung vor, die das Zusammenspiel von Mensch und Technik im Prozess der 
Entscheidungsfindung in den Mittelpunkt rückt. Es geht also um die Kollabo-
ration von menschlichen Akteuren und nicht-menschlichen Agenten in hybri-
den sozio-technischen Systemen sowie um die Rollenverteilung im digitalen 
Cockpit. Die zentrale Fragestellung lautet: Wie stark ist das Vertrauen von Pi-
loten in diese neuartige Form der Mensch-Maschine-Kollaboration ausgeprägt, 
insbesondere im Fall hochautomatisierter Systeme, die zunehmend autonom 
agieren? 
Die Ergebnisse der Studie sind teilweise überraschend: Das Vertrauen in die 
hybride Kollaboration ist sehr hoch und hängt stark mit der wahrgenommenen 
Symmetrie von Mensch und Technik sowie mit dem wahrgenommenen Wan-
del der Kompetenzen und der Rollenverteilung zusammen. Im Gegensatz dazu 
ergab die Frage nach der wahrgenommenen Komplexität nur mittlere Werte; 
die größte Überraschung war jedoch, dass sich dies nicht auf das Vertrauen in 
die hybride Kollaboration auswirkt. Die Unterschiede zwischen Airbus- und 
Boeing-Piloten sind viel geringer als erwartet. Piloten von Regionaljets, die 
zumeist Kurz- oder Mittelstrecke fliegen, heben sich jedoch von den beiden 
anderen Gruppen deutlich ab, vermutlich aufgrund des spezifischen Aufga-
benprofils mit häufigen Starts und Landungen, das viele Gelegenheiten zur 
Kollaboration mit den automatischen Systemen mit sich bringt. 
Schlagworte	
Mensch-Maschine-Interaktion, hochautomatisierte Systeme, Luftfahrt, Ver-
trauen, Komplexität, Befragung 
 
1. Introduction	
Since advanced automated systems entered the stage of civil aviation in the 
1980s, there has been a long-lasting debate among scientists as well as among 
practitioners, whether operators can rely on automation (Wiener/Curry 1980, 
Gras et al. 1994). Additionally, several factors that affect trust in automation in 
a positive or negative way have been identified, such as the design of displays 
and human-machine interface, or the training of crew communication 
(Sarter/Woods 1992, Parasuraman et al. 2008). 
Some debates, like the one on the cockpit with only two crewmembers, have 
been settled. Almost all manufacturers have now adopted the cockpit design of 
the Airbus A320, introduced in the late 1980s (Ibsen 2009). It has proofed its 
performance and – above all – has got a high record among pilots 
(Sarter/Woods 2000, Weyer 2008). 
Nevertheless, recent accidents of commercial airplanes have raised the ques-
tion once again, if pilots can rely on automation in order to fly a modern air-
craft safely. Issues like mode confusion, automation surprises, or loss-of-
control, which have been discussed and investigated since the 1980s 
(Wiener/Curry 1980, Billings 1997, Sarter/Woods 1997), suddenly “pop-up” 
again, as if nothing had happened in between. As the recent issue of the “Sta-
tistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents” (Boeing Commercial 
Airplanes 2013) points out, loss-of-control has even been the major cause of 
accidents of commercial airplanes with 1648 on-board fatalities in the period of 
2003 to 2012, compared to controlled-flight-into-terrain (CFIT), the second 
major cause with 971 on-board fatalities (p. 22). 
One example is the accident of Air France flight AF-447, where an Airbus 
A330 crashed over the Atlantic on June 1, 2009. Press reports initially had 
identified a mixture of bad weather conditions, technical failures of the pitot 
tubes, and a malfunctioning of the airborne computer systems as causes of this 
accident (e.g. FAZ 09.06.2009: 9). However, the accident investigation report 
clearly states that the plane has never been in a critical state, but basic skills 
have been missing in a stressful situation of only a few minutes length, which-
could have been managed by a well-trained crew (BEA 2012).1 
In contrast, the case of the Airbus A320, which survived a severe incident by 
watering on the Hudson River on January 15, 2009, points to the importance 
of basic skills, which Charles Sullenberger, however, had acquired in other con-
texts such as teaching, accident analysis, or flying sailplanes etc. (FAZ 
17.01.2009: 7). 
                                                
1 This has been confirmed by Peter Dehning (interview Dec. 10, 2012), a retired Lufthansa 
pilot who has been captain at the A330 for several years and experienced similar situations 
frequently. He stated that crews needed (i) a common mental picture of the situation, (ii) basic 
skills of flying stolidly straight on for a while without steering inputs, and (iii) a clear division of 
labour between the pilot flying and the pilot non-flying, the latter of whom should concentrate 
on the diagnosis and troubleshooting. 
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The near-accident of the Qantas A380 on November 4, 2010 also underlines 
the significance of well-trained humans as crisis managers on board of a highly 
automated plane. In this case, the pilots have been able to manage an extreme-
ly dangerous situation after the explosion of an engine that could have ended 
in a total loss of this brand new plane (FAZ 03.12.2010).2 
On the contrary, an Airbus A320 only survived a critical condition while land-
ing in Hamburg (Germany) during a thunderstorm on March 1, 2008 by a for-
tunate coincidence. This incident again revealed the weakness of the Airbus 
design, which inhibits pilots to take appropriate action in an emergency situa-
tion (BFU 2010). This also raises the question, whether a Boeing plane would 
have performed better (Dorschner 2012, Ibsen 2009, Braunberger 2006).3 
Hence, 25 years after the introduction of the glass cockpit and fly-by-wire 
technology into civil aviation, it seems to be reasonable to evaluate again if the 
socio-technical system “aircraft” is designed in a way that provides the human 
part with necessary means to cope with critical situations. Although accident 
rates have gone down during the last decades (Boeing Commercial Airplanes 
2013), the risk of a system failure is still present and may even rise in the future 
due to growing air traffic, increasing performance expectations, and a growing 
number of autonomously operating, unmanned aerial vehicles. 
These incidents and accidents point at the issue of human-machine interaction 
(HMI) in controlling complex socio-technical systems, which has been subject 
of human-factors research for decades (cf. among others Sheridan 2006, Grote 
2009). However, as automation increases more and more, a deeper understand-
ing of these topics is required, based also on novel sociological concepts, deal-
ing with the hybrid interaction of human actors and non-human technical 
agents (Rammert 2011). This change in perspective also demands for new 
strategies to investigate HMI issues empirically. 
We will argue in the following that automation research can gain by shifting 
from “either-or”-questions (either humans or machines) to the perspective of 
distributed action (Hutchins 1995), human-automation collaboration 
(Cummings/Bruni 2009), or coagency, respectively (Inagaki 2012), and, finally, 
hybrid socio-technical systems (Weyer 2006, Fink/Weyer 2014). The latter 
research strategy may better help to understand the role distribution in the 
digital cockpit and to figure out obstacles on a way to an efficient interaction 
between human and non-human parts of the hybrid socio-technical system 
aircraft. 
                                                
2 http://www.faz.net/-gqi-6lldp. 
3 Heinz Jürgen Lachmann, former president of the German pilot association VC, has argued 
that a Boeing plane would never have reached this critical stage because it allows pilots to 
countersteer sudden wind shears even near ground level, which is impossible at Airbus (per-
sonal communication Sept. 17, 2012). 
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As a first step towards an investigation of human-automation collaboration in 
advanced automated aircraft, we are searching for empirically informed an-
swers regarding the following questions: 
1. Do pilots have confidence in human-automation collaboration, even in 
the case of automated systems, which act more and more autonomous-
ly? 
2. Which factors, like e.g. the perception of changing competencies at the 
flight deck or complexity of automated systems, influence pilots’ confi-
dence? 
Starting with a theoretical overview of the academic debate on aviation auto-
mation, we will frame our five hypotheses in Section 2. Section 3 will present 
the study’s design, our methodology, and the constructs. In Section 4 we will 
outline and discuss our results in detail, after which Section 5 will summarize 
the results. 
2. Theoretical	background	
The issue of human-machine interaction has been subject of a variety of stud-
ies in automation research as well as within the theory of distributed action in 
hybrid systems. With regard to trustful and reliable collaboration, the following 
strands of research are relevant: the empirical, partly experimental analysis on 
trust in automation (Section 2.1) and the conceptual models of human-
automation collaboration (2.2). In the following, we will discuss these two is-
sues as well as the research on those factors, which may affect a reliable col-
laboration positively or negatively (2.3).  
2.1. Research	on	trust	in	automation	
Many investigations have been conducted on trust in automation in the field of 
ergonomics and human-factors research (Moray et al. 2000, Lee/See 2004, 
Dzindolet et al. 2003). Many of these studies have been guided by the concept 
of function allocation, asking why operators sometimes disuse or even misuse 
automation.4 
Overtrust – similar to complacency – can be regarded as a typical irony of au-
tomation, since systems that have proofed to be reliable for a long time may 
lead operators to misuse the automation in a sense that they become heedless 
and fail to check the system vigilantly (Inagaki/Itoh 2013). On the other hand, 
malfunctions and disappointed expectations have been identified as major 
sources of distrust in – and finally disuse of – automation. Referring to Manzey 
(2008, Onnasch et al. 2014), three main factors, which affect trust in automa-
tion can be identified: reliability, confirmability, and usefulness (cf. Figure 1). 
                                                
4 Parts of our arguments in this section are based on Robin Fink’s recent dissertation „Ver-
trauen in autonome Technik” (Fink 2014), especially on Chapter 4. 
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Trust in automation can be defined as an attitude in an interactive constellation 
in which one agent attributes expectations toward the other to perform parts 
of a common task in a predictable and cooperative way (Lee/See 2004). The 
behaviour of the automation, the transparency of the system and the useful-
ness of its operations (always: as perceived by the human) influence the level of 
trust on part of humans. 
Although referring to human-automation interaction, the cited concept of trust 
does not adopt a collaborative perspective, since trust in automation is mostly 
defined as a human activity attributing trust to technology, resulting in allocating 
the operation either to the automation or to the human (cf. Fink 2014: 83). 
Hence, we need a concept of confidence in human-machine collaboration that 
goes beyond the unilateral concept of trust in automation. In order to distin-
guish our approach from former ones, we use the term “confidence” in the 
following. 
The next section will briefly check concepts of human-automation interaction 
by including other perspectives, e.g. from sociology, which go beyond the 
scope of engineering and ergonomics research.  
2.2. Human-automation	 collaboration	 in	 hybrid	 socio-technical	
systems	
The traditional concept of function allocation (MABA-MABA)5, which served 
as a kind of starting point of human-factors research, puts forward the ques-
tion of who is better: the (hu)man or the machine (Fitts 1951). The human-
centred approach has gone beyond this perspective by accepting a large share 
of automated operations, but insisted on the ultimate decision authority on 
part of humans (cf. Sheridan/Parasuraman 2006: 94f.), the function of which 
has been described as “supervisory control” (Sheridan 1999). 
In contrast to these two varieties of “either-or” thinking, recent theorizing on 
this issue emphasizes an even more collaborative perspective of human-
                                                
5 “Men are better at – machines are better at”. 
trust
Factors affecting trust in automation
reliabilityli ili
confirmabilityi ili
usefulnessl
Figure 1: Factors affecting trust in automation (Manzey 2008) 
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automation decision making, which requires a “mutually supportive environ-
ment in which the human and computer collaborate to arrive at a solution su-
perior to that which either would have come to independently” 
(Cummings/Bruni 2009: 437). 
Distributed	agency	and	coagency	
Many researchers in the field agree with Sarter’s statement that humans and 
automated systems should act as “team players”, who communicate and coor-
dinate their actions (2000). These collaborative settings can be regarded as so-
cio-technical systems, the reliable functioning of which depends on “the quality 
of interaction of humans and automation” (Manzey 2008: 309, translated by 
the authors). 
Hutchins (1996, 2006) describes the cockpit as a distributed socio-technical 
system, where “memory tasks … may be accomplished by functional systems 
which transcend the boundaries of the individual actor” (1995: 284). His con-
cept of “distributed cognition” (1996) also transcends the borders of human 
agency, since “memory processes may be distributed among human agents, or 
between human agents and external representational devices” (1995: 284). 
Going beyond this cognitive concept, the CASA-model (“computers are social 
actors”, (cf. Reeves/Nass 1996)) analyses the modes of interaction in different 
settings (human/human, human/computers). By means of laboratory experi-
ments, Takayama and Nass discovered that people interacting with computers 
“actually engage in the same kinds of social responses that they use with hu-
mans” (2008: 174) – thus confirming a new kind of role perception on part of 
a human interacting with a machine.  
Moving one step further, Inagaki developed the concept of “human-
technology coagency” (2010), which assumes an equal status of both agents 
acting within the socio-technical system. Stepping beyond the model of hu-
man-centred automation, he argues that “situation-adaptive autonomy, in 
which the human and the machine trade authority dynamically depending on 
the situation gives better results than the case in which the human is always in 
command” (2010: 154). 
Hybrid	interaction	in	socio-technical	systems	
This idea of collaboration exceeds the traditional frame of ontological schemes 
in philosophy, which attribute agency only to humans (Sturma 2001). The ac-
tor-network theory (ANT) has – in a very provocative manner – pushed for-
ward the idea of symmetry of humans and nonhumans (Latour 1988, 1996), 
which needs a nonbiased analysis of mixed settings. 
Rammert and Schulz-Schaeffer refined this concept of distributed agency 
(Rammert 2011, Rammert/Schulz-Schaeffer 2002). From their point of view, 
agency is not an ontological quality of an entity but results from attribution 
processes that may assign agency as well to humans as to machines. Due to 
this attribution, humans assume rational reasons for actions – an attitude they 
 Johannes Weyer 
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apply both in interactions with humans as with computers, as the CASA con-
cept has already proofed. 
As Fink/Weyer (Fink/Weyer 2014) have shown, these hybrid constellations of 
human actors and autonomous technical agents can be investigated by means 
of simulation experiments. 
The conceptual approaches presented in this section transcend the traditional 
“either-or” perspective and depict a new picture of human-automation collab-
oration. Since the concept “trust in automation” only covers one side of the 
coin, we use the concept “confidence in hybrid collaboration” in the following, 
indicating a shift from a unilaterally directed relation between two entities to a 
multilateral concept of two or several agents, where confidence is not attribut-
ed from one part to another but towards the collaborative multi-agent ar-
rangement as a whole (cf. Figure 2). 
If this holds true, one source of confidence might be the symmetry of the col-
laborating partners. MABA-MABA and the concept of supervisory control 
both relate trust to the ability of the operator to override automation – and 
thus to an asymmetrical relation. In contrast, we assume that human-machine 
interaction in advanced automated systems can be regarded as a symmetrical 
constellation and that this symmetry serves as a source of confidence. In order 
to investigate this new constellation, we phrased our first hypothesis as fol-
lows: 
(H1) A high degree of perceived symmetry implies a high degree of 
perceived confidence in hybrid collaboration. 
To countercheck the opposite paradigm of “supervisory control” (Sheridan 
1999), arguing that pilots should always have the ultimate decision authority in 
the automated cockpit, we state as our second hypothesis:  
(H2) The more pilots want to have the ultimate authority, the lower is 
their confidence in hybrid collaboration. 
Hybrid systemi
New paradigm: confidence in hybrid collaboration
Automationi
Human
Human
Confidence
Collaboration
Figure 2: Confidence in hybrid collaboration 
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The next three hypotheses are more closely linked to automation-related prob-
lems in aviation, which we will discuss in the following section. 
2.3. Automation-related	problems	in	aviation	
At first glance, the aviation sector seems to be over-researched, especially re-
garding automation issues. There is a large number of academic (and non-
academic) publications on topics such as automation surprises, mode errors, 
complacency, and other issues of human-automation interaction in advanced 
automated aircraft. Different methods have been applied (partly combined), 
ranging from case studies, inflight observations (Hutchins 1995), workplace 
studies, analysis of pilots’ self-reports (Sarter/Woods 1997), secondary analysis 
of investigation reports or safety reporting systems, simulator experiments 
(Sarter/Woods 2000: 390) and, finally, surveys (BASI 1998, for an overview cf. 
Funk et al. 1999).  
However, since Wiener’s famous survey of pilots’ attitudes towards automation 
published in 1989, only four comparable surveys have been conducted, partly 
replicating his study (see Table 1). Furthermore, only one of these four surveys 
(Naidoo 2008) has been conducted since the year 2000, which points at the 
need of replicating this kind of inquiry and to collect up-to-date evidence on 
aviation automation. Surprisingly, research on trust in aviation automation is 
rather scarce, compared to the large number of studies in this field in general.6 
There is only one study (Naidoo 2008) that takes this issue into account – with 
inconclusive results though (see below). 
Comparison	of	pilot	surveys	
Furthermore, the four studies apply different methodologies, partly descriptive 
statistics with single items (uni-/bivariate), partly factor analysis (multivariate). 
But even descriptive statistics differ insofar as some studies refer to mean val-
ues, others to percentages. For example, concerning the issue of mode under-
standing, McClumpha et al. calculated a mean value of 3.57 on a five-point 
scale, saying that most pilots understand “all the modes and features of the 
FMS” (1991: 110).7 
On the other hand, the Australian Bureau of Air Safety Investigation found out 
that 10.9 % of the pilots disagree when being asked about mode understanding 
(BASI 1998: 42). However, if one recalculates this numbers using the original 
data, the mean value amounts to 3.8 – even slightly better than 3.57. 
So the question arises, which numbers are meaningful to what extent? If a rele-
vant share of pilots gives negative answers (or fails to perform in simulator 
experiments), this can be regarded as an indicator of risk. According to Sarter  
                                                
6 We define automation as „the transfer of singular functions or even complete tasks from 
humans to machines” (Manzey 2008: 309f.), which may include manual operations, manual 
control or cognitive tasks. Aviation automation thus may refer to automated operations (e.g. 
maintaining speed), automated control (e.g. setting parameters) or automated decision-making 
(e.g. switching flight modes). 
7 FMS – Flight Management System 
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Table	 1:	 Outlook	 of	
pilots'	surveys	
Wiener	
1989	
McClumpha	
1991	
BASI	1998	 Hutchins	
1999	
Naidoo	2008	
	 method	 survey	 survey	 survey	 survey	 survey	
	 number	of	items	 36	 78	 42	 16	 85	
	 N	 299	 572	 1268	 562	 262	
	 type	of	analysis	 descriptive	 component	
analysis	and	
descriptive	
descriptive	 descriptive,	
correlations,	
cluster	and	
factor	analysis	
descriptive	and	
factor	analysis	
	 Uni/bivariate	analysis	 		 		 		 		 		
1	 positive	attitudes	towards	
aviation	automation	
yes	 yes	 		 yes	 yes	
2	 pilot	out-of-loop	 		 no	 yes	 		 		
3	 pilot	as	manager	 yes	 		 		 yes	 		
4	 boring	monitoring	tasks	 		 		 yes	(Airb:no)	 		 		
5	 “button	pusher”	 no	 		 		 no	 		
6	 automation	leads	to	head	
down	
		 no	 		 		 undeterm.	
7	 mode	confusion	 no	
(but	25%)	
no	 no	(but	10,9%)	 no	 		
yes	(Airb:yes)	
undeterm.		
(but	31%)	
no	(but	15%)	
8	 automation	surprises	 yes	 no	 yes	
(Airb:	
yes)	
		 		
9	 switch	to	manual	mode	 		 yes	 		 		 		
10	 coping	with	problems	 no	(but	
25%)	
yes	 		 undeterm.	 		
11	 automation	hinders	crew	
communication	
no	 no	 		 		 		
12	 Airbus	vs.	Boeing	 		 		 Airb:	
yes	(see	above)	
		 Airb:	
yes	(design)	
13	 short-range	vs.	long-range	 		 		 		 		 yes	
(training:	co-pilots	
on	long-range)	
	 Multivariate	analysis	 descriptive	 correlations	 descriptive	 descriptive	 correlations	
14	 Factor	“(system)	under-
standing”	
		 neg.	
(age/recode
d)	
pos.	(expe-
rience)	
yes	
(but	21%,	
Airb:no)	
neg.	
(experience)	
neg.	(age)	
neg.	(experience)	
15	 Factor	“(good)	training”	 yes	 		 		 yes	 neg.	(age)	
neg.	(experience)	
16	 Factor	“trust	(in	automa-
tion)”	
		 		 		 		 pos.	(experience,	
effects	too	small)	
17	 Factor	“(lower)	workload”	 		 pos.	(CPT)	 yes	 yes	 no	signif.	corr.	
18	 Factor	“(good)	design”	 		 neg.	
(experience)	
yes	
(Airb:no)	
yes	
(experience)	
pos.	(experience,	
effects	too	small)	
Airb:pos.	
19	 Factor	“skills	(loss)”	 yes	 neg.	(age)	 undeterm.	 yes	 		
	 Legend:	
pos	–	positive	correlation	(items	in	brackets)	
neg	–	negative	correlation	(items	in	brackets)	
yes	–	most	pilots	agree	(mean	value	>	3,	partly	recoded)	
no	–	most	pilots	disagree	(mean	value	<	3,	partly	recoded)	
but	–	a	relevant	share	is	mentioned	by	authors	to	vote	for	the	opposite	direction	
Airb	–	Airbus	pilots	differ	from	Boeing	pilots	
 
  
Can pilots still fly? 
 
15 
et al. (2000: 399), this should be taken seriously. By means of simulator exper-
iments on mode errors (with 18 probands) they discovered that automation 
surprises still exist and only 22 to 67 percent of the pilots did take appropriate 
action, while the others failed.8 
Mean values tend to mask these risks, at least when percentages of negative 
answers or negative performance are lower than 25%. Hence, assessment of 
data may be very divers depending on the look at mean values or percentages. 
For an overview, we therefore tried to harmonize results of five surveys in a 
way that makes them comparable. Percentages have been converted into mean 
values, but relevant shares of answers that may point to risks have been noted 
as well (cf. Table 1). Additionally, since questions sometimes headed into op-
posite directions, answers have been carefully adapted and partly recoded.9 
Results	of	pilot	surveys	
The state of the art in research on automation in aviation, as represented by 
five pilot surveys (cf. Table 1), can be summarized as follows:10 
• Pilots’ attitudes towards automation are generally positive (line 1).* 
• Pilots regard themselves as managers of a complex system (line 3) but 
not as “button pushers” who passively react to the system (line 5).* 
• Most pilots understand the modes of the automated systems, but mode 
confusion is still an issue for 10 to 25 percent of the interviewed per-
sons (line 7).* 
• Automation surprises still occur (line 8).* 
• In some cases, Airbus pilots give very different answers than Boeing 
pilots (lines 4, 7, 8, 12, cf. also lines 14, 18).* 
• A similar difference can be observed in case of pilots on short-range 
flights (line 13).* 
Moreover, two reports have conducted a component analysis leading to four 
(McClumpha et al. 1991)11 or six factors (Naidoo 2008) partly overlapping.12 
Their findings (complemented by some of the arguments of other surveys) can 
be summarized as follows: 
                                                
8 We excluded one „nasty” exercise, where only one out of 14 pilots managed to perform the 
task. 
9 We take line 14 (“system understanding”) to explain the coding of Table 1: By means of 
multivariate analysis, McClumpha et al. (1991) found a negative correlation („neg”) of age and 
system understanding but a positive correlation (“pos”) between experience and system under-
standing. Descriptive analyses that confirm these findings are added in italics. According to 
BASI (1998), most pilots report a good system understanding (“yes”), except from 21% who 
disagree (“but:21%”). Additionally, a higher share of Airbus pilots disagree compared to Boe-
ing pilots (“Airb:no”). 
10 The asterisks indicate which items we will consider later in our study. 
11 This study is methodologically sound but based on bi-polar statements on a five-point scale, 
which may make some results invalid and complicate comparison with other studies. 
12 Hutchins et al. (1999) also conducted different factor and cluster analysis but mixed them up 
in a confusing way. It is only partly possible to compare their findings with the other two stud-
ies. 
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• System understanding is negatively correlated with age, which means: 
younger pilots report a better understanding than older ones (line 14 – 
strong agreement among reports).* 
• System understanding is negatively correlated with experience: The 
more time pilots have spent with advanced flight decks automation, the 
less is their understanding (line 14 – partly contradictory findings). 
• Trust in automation has been investigated by only one study, leading to 
inconclusive results (line 16).* 
• Workload has been reduced by automation (line 17 – weak evidence). 
• There is no clear evidence if the automated flight deck is well designed 
and if correlations of design and experience or design and type rating 
(Airbus vs. Boeing) exist (line 18).* 
• The degradation of flight skills is negatively correlated with age, mean-
ing that older pilots are less concerned (line 19 – inconsistent evi-
dence).* 
To sum it up: There is only limited consensus among experts in the field of 
aviation automation. Furthermore, except from a few items (namely: general 
attitudes, system understanding, and mode confusion) there is no clear evi-
dence concerning the effects automation has on the ability of human pilots to 
successfully manage the complex socio-technical system aircraft. Empirical 
evidence is inconclusive concerning the questions whether pilots’ skills and 
competencies have improved or degraded since the introduction of the ad-
vanced automated aircraft and whether pilots regard these developments as 
positive. 
Since our study focuses on confidence in hybrid collaboration (lines 1, 14, 16), 
we decided to primarily include issues of role distribution (lines 3, 5, 19), type 
rating (lines 12, 14, 18), and complexity (lines 7, 8), and neglect other topics 
such as training (line 15) or workload (line 17). 
To cover the changes in role distribution between pilot and automation, we 
phrased our third hypothesis as follows, assuming a positive impact on confi-
dence: 
(H3) A high degree of (perceived) changing competencies implies a 
(perceived) high level of confidence in hybrid collaboration. 
A confident collaboration between humans and automation may suffer from 
lacking system transparency caused by its complexity and increasing autonomy. 
Therefore, our fourth hypothesis reads as follows: 
(H4) The more complexity is perceived, the lower is the level of confi-
dence in hybrid collaboration. 
Differences between the product philosophies of the two big aircraft manufac-
turers, that show up in the surveys, are also mentioned frequently in literature, 
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with a high level of automation control at Airbus, where the automation can 
even override the operator, while Boeing pilots always have more scope to take 
decisions (Ibsen 2009, Dorschner 2012, Naidoo 2008: 10-41). We assume that 
this leeway has a positive effect on confidence. Hence, our fifth hypothesis is: 
(H5) Boeing pilots perceive a higher level of confidence in hybrid col-
laboration. 
Moreover, the results of former research reveal differences between pilots of 
long-range and short-range aircraft, probably caused by different task profiles 
with a higher frequency of landings at short-range flights and more opportuni-
ties to interact with automation. According to the state of research on aviation, 
we will also have to control for age and service type (short-haul vs. long-haul) 
which may affect the dependent variable “confidence in hybrid collabora-
tion”.13 
2.4. Excursus	on	methods	of	automation	research	
Usefulness	of	surveys	
Admittedly, doubts may arise whether a survey of pilots’ attitudes is a suitable 
way to study these issues. Surveys and retrospective recordings provide valua-
ble data on individual experiences and perceptions; however, they face the 
problem of different biases, like the one of social desirability (Sarter/Woods 
2000: 391). This applies all the more in case of well-trained professionals who 
have studied complacency and other automated-related issues intensively – at 
aviation school, in further training, or maybe also because they work as instruc-
tors or supervisors. 
Most of the questionnaires used in the past contained several plump and sug-
gestive statements, which directly referred to theoretical discourses and forced 
probands to give answers in a reflective manner, such as “The overall work-
                                                
13 Since age is highly correlated with experience, we disregard experience as separate variable. 
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load on this flight deck is much lower than on a non-automated one” 
(McClumpha et al. 1991: 110). This kind of probes runs the risk of receiving 
predominantly textbook answers – instead of individual perceptions. 
Of course, perceptions do neither reflect reality “correctly”, nor do they offer a 
direct link to factual behaviour, but they provide a cue to the individual con-
struction of reality (Berger/Luckmann 1980). These constructs are important 
components of decision-making, as psychological theory of behaviour (Naidoo 
2008: 37ff.) or sociological theory of action (Esser 1993) tell us (cf. Figure 3). 
Except from surveys, various other methods have been applied investigating 
automation issues in aviation. 
Helmreich/Sexton:	Analysis	of	safety	climate	
Helmreich, Sexton and others also conducted a large number of surveys (in 
health and in aviation sector)14, but they took individual perceptions only as a 
means to deduce the organisational safety climate.15 The latter (independent 
variable) was examined as a factor that positively or negatively affects team 
performance (dependent variable) (Helmreich/Sexton 2004). The scientists 
figured out that “highly effective cockpit crews use one third of their commu-
nications to discuss threads and errors in their environment, regardless of their 
workload, whereas poor performing teams spend about 5% of their time doing 
the same” (Sexton et al. 2000: 748). 
Without a doubt, this research strategy is an important step (i) to overcome the 
individualistic perspective of most studies, (ii) to bridge the “gap” between 
perceptions and behaviour, and (iii) to move towards an analysis of organisa-
tional culture(s) similar to the studies Hofstede et al. (2010) conducted. How-
ever, although very valuable, these studies do not (or only marginally) deal with 
automation issues but mainly attitudes towards teamwork and hierarchy and 
thus do not contribute much to the debate on aviation automation. 
Sarter	et	al.:	Simulator	experiments	
As mentioned above, Sarter, Woods, and others have applied different meth-
ods, among others simulator experiments, which mostly tested pilots’ ability to 
cope with mode errors. Sarter and Woods argue that many incidents and acci-
dents are rooted in “breakdowns in coordination between crew and automa-
tion” (2000: 5), which, amongst others, come from a violation of “pilots’ ex-
pectations about automation behaviour” (Sarter/Woods 1997: 562). They 
point at the mismatch between pilots’ mental models and the system’s state, 
which is less observable to the operators, when the system has a higher degree 
of autonomy and authority (Sarter 2008). 
                                                
14 A variety of questionnaires, which have mostly been used in the health sector can be down-
loaded at https://med.uth.edu/chqs/surveys/safety-attitudes-and-safety-climate-questionnaire. 
15 It is rather difficult to figure out how the authors developed their results. Only superficial 
summaries have been published, but not the original research. 
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Complemented by Manzey (2008: 317) the following crucial factors can be 
identified as causes for pilot’s errors (cf. Figure 4): 
1. Poor monitoring of the system caused by overreliance and low vigi-
lance; 
2. poor feedback on part of the automated systems, caused by poorly 
designed interfaces and displays; 
3. lacking transparency of the system’s state, mostly caused by the sys-
tem’s complexity and increasing autonomy; 
4. gaps in pilots’ mental models (e.g. in case of lacking situation 
awareness).16 
Compared to surveys, methods such as inflight observations or simulator ex-
periments come closer to real behaviour but face other methodological limita-
tions such as small numbers of probands or the artificial character of crisis 
scenarios. Additionally, they run the risk to deduce attitudes (independent vari-
ables) that cannot be measured directly from observed behaviour (dependent 
variable). For example, Sarter et al. assert: “As there is no direct measure of 
mode awareness, pilot’s level of awareness of the automation configuration 
was inferred from their responses to scenario events” (2000: 395) – a problem-
atic mixing of dependent and independent variables. A combination of differ-
ent methods, e.g. simulator experiments andquestionnaires, might help to 
overcome those deficits (cf. Fink/Weyer 2014). 
Are	surveys	still	a	useful	method?	
In spite of the limitations and alternatives discussed above, a well-designed 
survey seems to be an indispensable component of a comprehensive analysis 
                                                
16 It is difficult to figure out, if Sarter et al. really have investigated all these aspects and if the 
design of their studies is sufficient to make far-reaching statement of this kind. 
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of human-machine interaction in automated systems like the digital cockpit, 
best combined with other methods. A survey may help to figure out pilots’ 
perceptions and attitudes towards advanced automated aircraft, but above all 
they may help to find out whether (perceptions of) automation-related prob-
lems have changed in the last decades.  
However, an up-to-date questionnaire ought to avoid suggestive questions and 
abstract statements directly derived from automation theory. It should fur-
thermore reflect the shift from the MABA-MABA-concept17 of the past, which 
forced to think “either-or”, to more recent concepts of human-automation 
collaboration (HAC), which put emphasis on the team play and cooperation of 
humans and autonomous technology. 
2.5. Interim	conclusion	and	research	model	
Our outlook of research on aviation automation presents a surprisingly ambig-
uous picture. Despite decades of investigation there is only limited empirical 
evidence on major issues like trust in (aviation) automation as well as a lacking 
consensus among researchers on many other topics (cf. Section 2.3). 
Moreover, recent theorizing on human-automation collaboration (Section 2.1) 
points at the need to reframe the theoretical model and to create a suitable 
research strategy to empirically investigate new types of hybrid constellations. 
Departing from previous research on aviation automation we want to find out 
if pilots have confidence in collaboration within a hybrid socio-technical sys-
tem consisting of human and non-human players, and if so, which factors af-
fect their confidence positively or negatively. 
                                                
17 “Men are better at – machines are better at” (Fitts 1951). 
Research model
confidence in
hybrid collaboration
i i
i ll i
(H1) perception of symmetryi
(H2) ultimate authorityl i i
(H3) changing competenciesi i
(H4) perception of complexityi l i
(H5) type rating (Airbus/Boeing)i i i
control variables: age, rangel i l
+
+
-
-
B+
Figure 5: Research model “confidence in hybrid collaboration” 
Can pilots still fly? 
 
21 
Our research model (cf. Figure 5) puts confidence in hybrid collaboration as depend-
ent variable and tests the five derived hypotheses by means of five independent 
variables, namely perception of symmetry, ultimate authority, changing competencies, per-
ception of complexity, and type rating. Additionally, pilots’ age and range (short-/long-
range) are used as control variables. 
3. Methodology	
3.1. Design	of	the	study,	sample	
Mixed	methods	approach	
For our study, we decided to approach the issue of confidence in hybrid col-
laboration by means of a mixed method design in alignment with Creswell et 
al. (2003: 212). Our approach can be explained as a synthesis of sequential ex-
ploratory and sequential explanatory research designs by combining a qualita-
tive interview study with a quantitative online survey in order to figure out 
pilots’ confidence in human-machine collaboration in the advanced automated 
aircraft. A final step was the validation of results through aviation experts. 
Questionnaire	
Although there already exist several surveys in the field of aviation (cf. Section 
2.3), we decided to develop a partly new questionnaire, which helps to answer 
our research questions and to take a conceptually new perspective. 
Interviews	with	pilots	
Therefore we conducted interviews with experts in this field, i.e. the pilots 
themselves. The issue of confidence has been explored by nine semi-structured 
interviews, which have taken place in January 2007, with pilots of an interna-
tional airline at a regional German airport (cf. Weyer 2008). Given the pilots’ 
permission, the interviews were recorded, transcribed, and anonymised. The 
main finding of this investigation has been the existence of different role per-
ceptions on part of the pilots, concerning their interaction with the autopilot. 
Although the romantic picture of the “pilot flying the machine” is still present, 
most pilots regarded themselves as “system managers” of a complex system, 
whose primary task is not to fly the aircraft manually but to make good deci-
sions. 
Types	of	system	managers	
However, we could identify two types of system managers: (i) the system ob-
server, who draws her/himself back to a purely monitoring position absolutely 
relying on technology, (ii) and the collaborator. The latter perceives 
her/himself as a partner in a symmetrical constellation of human and technol-
ogy, which mutually control each other (P5: 121-140). The main task thus is to 
vigilantly monitor the system and to anticipate its actions: 
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“… but you feel like you stay ahead of the game and you stay on track of what 
is going on.” (P5: 124) 
“You let the automatics, too, but you keep a distance …” (P4: 396) 
With the help of a content analysis we identified some further relevant and 
field-adjusted issues that we included in our questionnaire. The latter avoids 
suggestive questions and abstract statements directly derived from automation 
theory. 
Survey	and	sample	
The online-questionnaire has been submitted electronically in summer 2008 to 
a large number of pilots, using the distribution lists of the German pilots asso-
ciation “Vereinigung Cockpit” (VC), of the pilots’ educational network “For-
schungszentrum für die Hochschulausbildung von Piloten” (FHP), and of two 
German airlines. We received 278 completed questionnaires, out of which – 
after data cleansing – 199 could be used for detailed statistical analysis via 
SPSS. The results of our analysis have been presented to aviation experts who 
gave valuable feedback and hints for validation and further interpretation. 
 
Figure 6: Age groups of pilots 
Age	and	gender	
The mean age of respondents was 39.9 years, ranging from 22 to 73. Five pi-
lots older than 60 years participated in the survey. The distribution of gender 
was unequal: only 11 of 184 respondents (6.0 percent) were female. Pilots of 
female gender were much younger (29.7 years, ranging from 25 to 36), com-
pared to their male colleagues (40.1 years). However, this distribution fits to 
the general share of female pilots in German airlines of about 6 percent. 
As Figure 6 shows, the largest group are pilots in the age of 30 to 34 years. 
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Airlines,	experience	and	position	
The largest groups are pilots from Lufthansa (45.1%) and Eurowings (31.7%), 
which later became part of the Lufthansa group, while only few pilots from 
low-cost airlines and other competitors of Lufthansa participated in the survey 
(10.3%). 
Most pilots were experienced (perfectly related to their age) and had a mean of 
7.254 flight hours on planes with more than 20 tons maximum take-off weight 
(MTOW), thereof 3.490 hours on the type currently flown. 94 of them (48.7%) 
were first officers (FO) or senior first officers (SFO), while the other 99 pilots 
were higher ranked captains (CPT), none of them female. 
 
Figure 7: Type rating (grouped) 
Type	rating	
Concerning current type rating, the largest group of pilots (21.1%) flew Cana-
dair Regional Jets (CRJ), followed by Boeing 737 (15.5%), AVRO/BAE 146 
(14.9%) and Airbus A320 (13.4%). 
Grouped by manufacturers, the smaller regional jets were the largest group 
(38.1%), followed by Boeing (27.8%) and Airbus (26.8%, cf. Figure 7).18 
43 pilots (22.2%) flew long-range aircraft such as Airbus A330/340 or Boeing 
747, while all others flew short or medium-range planes such as Airbus A320, 
Canadair Regional Jet or Boeing 737.19 
                                                
18 The category “regional jets” comprises aircraft of different manufacturers and ages with 
various levels of automation, such as CRJ, Avro/BAE 146 and others. 
19 Unfortunately our data set does not allow differentiating between the 3rd generation [begin-
ning automation] and the 4th generation [high level of automation] of jet airliners; (cf. 
Scheiderer/Ebermann 2010: 3). For reasons of data protection, the questionnaire had to be 
cleaned of questions that might be used to identify singular individuals. 
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3.2. Constructs:	dependent	and	independent	variables	
All constructs were developed against the background of the conceptional shift 
from the traditional unilateral concept of “trust in automation” towards the 
more recent multilateral concept “human-automation collaboration” within the 
hybrid socio-technical system aircraft (cf. Section 2.2). 
The	dependent	variable	“confidence	in	hybrid	collaboration”	
For the measurement of the dependent variable, we developed several items 
based on relevant and field-adjusted issues, which were mentioned during the 
interviews. Six items were measured on a six-point Likert scale (1 = totally 
disagree, 6 = totally agree). The scale of the dependent variable includes the 
following items (cf. Table 2).  
Today, flying an aircraft is mainly based on routines. 
Without technical assistance systems pilots feel unprotected nowadays. 
Pilots monitor the system and only take control in terms of adverse events. 
Pilots are developing more and more in the direction of systems administrators. 
The main task of pilots is rather to navigate the aircraft, i.e. programming the flight manage-
ment system, than to directly manually control it. 
Pilots are increasingly becoming machine operators.  
Table 2: Items referring to confidence 
A principal component analysis shows that all items load on one factor (KMO-
value = .765, explained variance 39.71%). The scale “confidence in hybrid collabora-
tion” is acceptably reliable with Cronbach’s Alpha of .685.20 
All respondents were ranked into four percentile groups according to their 
factor value, indicating different levels of confidence (cf. Table 3). 
Factor value Percentile Percentile group 
2.09188 (maximum) 100 4 – very high confidence 
0.7999907 75 3 – high confidence 
0.0450369 50 2 – low confidence 
-0.6462699 25 1 – very low confidence 
-3.02093 (minimum)   
Table 3: Percentile groups (confidence) 
This construct measures pilots’ confidence in collaboration with automation 
on board of the hybrid socio-technical system aircraft. 
The	independent	variable	“perception	of	symmetry”	
Referring to Latour (1996) and others we assume a symmetry of humans and 
non-humans. Translated into practical terms, this concept encompassed a mu-
tual perception of humans and non-humans as equally ranked partners, who 
both can take decisions and coordinate their actions (Fink/Weyer 2014). In 
order to operationalise the first hypothesis that a high degree of perceived symmetry 
implies a high degree of perceived confidence in hybrid collaboration, we used three items 
                                                
20 This scale was also used as an additive index for descriptive analysis in Section 4.2. 
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measured on a six-point Likert scale (1 = totally disagree, 6 = totally agree, cf. 
Table 4). 
When entering flight commands, the computer functions as a kind of consultant who points 
out conflicts to the pilot. 
Pilot and automated system mutually control each other. 
Technical support systems in modern aircraft are designed to give action recommendations to 
pilots. 
Table 4: Items referring to symmetry 
The items load on one factor (KMO-value = .639, explained variance of 
60.69%), and the scale “perception of symmetry” is also acceptably reliable 
with a Cronbach’s alpha value of .674.  
Table 5 lists the four percentile groups indicating levels of perceived symmetry 
between human and automation. 
Factor value Percentile Percentile group 
2,3562 (maximum) 100 4 – complete symmetry 
0,7311777 75 3 – much symmetry 
0,1018817 50 2 – little (??) symmetry 
-0,8017398 25 1 – no symmetry 
-2,56514 (minimum)   
Table 5: Percentile groups (symmetry) 
The construct measures whether pilots perceive the technical systems on board 
of the aircraft as an equally ranked partner. 
Independent	variable	“ultimate	authority”	
To test our second hypothesis, that the more pilots want to have the ultimate authori-
ty, the lower is their confidence in hybrid collaboration, we developed several items by 
using quotes from the qualitative study (cf. Table 6). 
Even if it is technically possible to fly aircraft remotely controlled, pilots, who are responsible 
for the flight, are still required on board. 
Ultimately, it always has to be a human being who is taking responsibility on board. 
Even in the future, the pilot has to be superior to technology and must not be dominated by 
it. 
Even if completely automated air traffic would be possible in the future, pilots are still needed 
to intervene in case of technical failure. 
Table 6: Items of ultimate authority 
These items load on one factor with an acceptable KMO-value of .694, an 
explained variance of 51.65%, and a Cronbach’s alpha of .682. 
In contrast to the variable “perception of symmetry”, this construct measures 
to which extent pilots wish to have a traditional role distribution between the 
human operator and the non-human parts of the socio-technical system air-
craft. 
Independent	variable	“changing	competencies”	
The third hypothesis, that a high degree of (perceived) changing competencies implies a 
(perceived) high level of confidence in hybrid collaboration, is measured with the help of 
four items (cf. Table 7). 
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These items load on one factor (KMO-value = .753, explained variance of 
54.82%). The scale is reliable with a Cronbach’s alpha value of .726.  
The pilot does no longer have the same decision-making power as in the past. 
In former times, pilots’ decisions were much more based on personal experience and assess-
ment. 
The actual flying is taking less and less room in pilots’ actions. 
Good flying skills are becoming less important nowadays. 
Table 7: Items of changing competencies 
Again, all respondents were ranked according to their factor value into four 
percentile groups, indicating the different levels of (perceived) change (cf. Ta-
ble 8). 
Factor value Percentile Percentile group 
2,24017 (maximum) 100 4 – very much change 
0.7108077 75 3 – much change 
0.020132 50 2 – few change 
-0.6211536 25 1 – very few change 
- 2,82461 (minimum)   
Table 8: Percentile groups (competencies) 
The construct measures if pilots confirm a shift in the role distribution be-
tween humans and automation compared to former times. 
Independent	variable	“perception	of	complexity”	
For the fourth hypothesis – the more complexity is perceived, the lower is the level of 
confidence in hybrid collaboration – we refer to Charles Perrow (1984) and others 
who stress that a complex system entails non-linear interactions which lead to 
emergent system states that are at least partly incomprehensible to its opera-
tors. Insofar the definition of complexity is always bound to the perception of 
intransparency and lacking understanding of the system’s behaviour (Weyer 
2009). Therefore, we captured pilots’ perception by using a construct with two 
items measured on a 6-point scale (1 = totally agree, 6 = totally disagree – cf. 
Table 9). 
Table 10 lists the four percentile groups indicating different levels of perceived 
complexity of highly automated systems. 
Pilots do not receive sufficient background information (system knowledge) to really under-
stand the technical systems. 
Today's aircraft is a black box for the pilot. One knows how to operate it but not how it actu-
ally functions. 
Table 9: Items of perceived complexity 
Factor value Percentile Percentile group 
2,16935 (maximum) 100 4 – very high complexity 
0,8975639  75 3 – high complexity 
0,0943712 50 2 – low complexity 
-1,043244 25 1 – very low complexity 
-1,84644 (minimum)   
Table 10: Percentile groups (complexity) 
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Type	rating,	range	and	age21	
Additionally, we have controlled the type rating (1 = Boeing, 0 = all others) in 
order to test the fifth hypothesis, in which we assume that Boeing pilots perceive a 
higher level of confidence in hybrid collaboration than Airbus pilots. Finally we con-
trolled for range (1 = long range, 0 = short range) and age by using a metric 
scale of age at the time of interrogation. We assume that older pilots may have 
had considerable experience with 3rd generation aircraft, too, while younger 
pilots have started their career on 4th generation advanced automated aircraft, 
which had been introduced in the late 1980s.22 
4. Empirical	results	
The next chapter will present the main empirical results, starting with a regres-
sion analysis that later will be complemented by a more detailed breakdown of 
numbers. 
4.1. Regression	analysis	
For further multivariate analysis, we used OLS-regression analysis to test our 
hypotheses. Table 11 shows the result of the regression model where we pre-
sent the effects by standardized beta-coefficients, so that they are comparable 
in their relative strength. 
Table 11: OLS-Regression “confidence in trustful collaboration” 
For the whole sample, the factors contribute well to one third of the variance 
as the adjusted r2-value of .330 shows. 
As this brief overview demonstrates, hypotheses H1 and H3 can strongly be 
confirmed, while H2 and H4 have to be rejected. The following section will 
refer to these findings and complement them with a more detailed analysis of 
our variables and their relations among each other. 
                                                
21 The descriptive analysis of the sample related to these variables is to be found in Section 3.1. 
22 We didn’t include gender as additional variable because numbers are too small. 
Confidence in hybrid collaboration Beta 
(H1) Perception of symmetry .258** 
(H2) Ultimate authority -.066 
(H3) Changing competencies .360** 
(H4) Perception of complexity -.001 
(H5) Type rating (1=Boeing) -.101+ 
Range (1=long) -.160* 
Age (metric scale) .096 
N 199 
Adjusted r2 .330 
**p<0,01	*p<0,05	+p<0,1  
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4.2. Descriptive	analysis	
Confidence	in	hybrid	collaboration	
First, we want to point to the fact that pilots in general have confidence in 
hybrid collaboration with a mean value of 4.37 (median 4.50), which is remark-
ably above the average of 3.5. A large share has got high (56.0%) or very high 
confidence (32.1%), while low confidence is small (11.5%) and very low confi-
dence non-existent.23 There is no correlation with age or experience. 
Perception	of	symmetry	(H1)	
The level of perceived symmetry is almost normally distributed among pilots 
(mean 3.54; median 3.67), indicating that various groups of pilots have differ-
ent opinions. The two extremes – complete symmetry (9.5%) and no symmetry 
at all (10.0%) – comprise only small groups, while the majority opted for the 
positions in between, divided into two parts: much (44.8%) and little symmetry 
(35.6%). Again, there is no correlation with age or experience. 
 
Figure 8: Symmetry by type rating 
However, Figure 8 demonstrates differences regarding type rating: pilots of 
regional jets belong to percentile group 3 (much symmetry - median ,3580744), 
which ranks them higher than Airbus (-,1557835) and Boeing (-,4587311) pi-
lots, both belonging to group 2 (little symmetry), but with remarkable differ-
ences concerning factor values. This distinction can also be found between 
short-range (,1364762) and long-range aircraft (-,1839000 – no figure).24 
                                                
23 These numbers refer to the six-point Likert scale aggregating six expressions into four 
groups similar to the four percentile groups. 
24 Only the difference between Boeing and regional jets has been confirmed by t-tests, the 
other tests have failed. 
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Pilots flying short or medium distances with a high number of take-offs and 
landings perceive automation to a higher extent than others as equally ranked 
partner, maybe because of a higher number of experiences, where pilots and 
automation act as team players. 
Referring to our main issue of confidence, regression analysis has shown a 
positive and significant effect for the first indicator (.258**): A high degree of 
perceived symmetry between (human) pilots and (non-human) technical com-
ponents of the socio-technical system aircraft implies a high degree of confi-
dence in hybrid collaboration (this is also supported by Figure 9, which pre-
sents the level of confidence on part of the four percentile groups of “sym-
metry”). Reliable collaboration – as in the case of two humans – seems to de-
pend on the idea of an equal status of two partners, be it humans or non-
human devices, that collaborate while operating and controlling the aircraft. 
(H1) Therefore, our first hypothesis is supported. 
 
Figure 9: Distribution of confidence by four factor groups of perceived symmetry 
Ultimate	authority	(H2)	
Our data show an almost unanimous voting for ultimate decision authority on 
part of human pilots (mean 5.75, median 6.00), indicating that almost all pilots 
totally agree with this argument. Hence, further descriptive analysis of this var-
iable makes little sense. 
Regression analysis has already shown a (weak) negative impact (-,066) of the 
independent variable “ultimate authority” on confidence in hybrid collabora-
tion. Apparently, the more pilots adhere to the traditional role definition of the 
human as ultimate decider and the more they claim to have the ultimate au-
thority (in any case), the less they confide in hybrid collaboration. They ascribe 
a superior position to humans, which can in no case be substituted or com-
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plemented by autonomous technical systems. However, this negative effect is 
not significant. 
(H2) Hence, we have to reject our second hypothesis. 
At first sight, this adherence to a traditional role distribution seems to contra-
dict our findings concerning the high level of confidence pilots have in hybrid 
collaboration (see above). However, this effect is only weak and not significant, 
which allows reconciling these two findings. Besides, debating these results 
with aviation experts, most pilots could not see a conflict. They claimed an 
ultimate authority on part of the pilot, including the option to forgo this right 
and to collaborate with automation on an equal footing, but also to withdraw 
to a superior position if necessary. 
Changing	competencies	(H3)	
The descriptive analysis of pilots’ responses again demonstrates a divided pop-
ulation with a mean of 3.86 and a median of 4.00. The majority opted for very 
much (18.6%) or much change (42.6%), while little (30.5%) and very little 
change (7.5%) is represented far less. There is no single correlation – neither 
with age nor with other variables. 
 
Figure 10: Competencies by type rating 
Nevertheless, as Figure 10 shows, type rating seems to matter again, since pi-
lots of regional jets belong to percentile group 3 (much change – median 
,371118), while Airbus (-,1146763) and Boeing pilots (-,0408733) belong to 
group 2 (few change) – with rather similar values. Additional t-tests confirm 
the significance of this difference. 
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Furthermore, pilots of long range aircraft (median -,0501337) perceive less 
change than others (,0816573).25 Taken together, these data point to the fact 
that the biggest change – as perceived by pilots – towards automated flying has 
taken place in the field of short- and medium-range regional jets, where older 
and less automated types of aircraft have been replaced by more modern ones 
but are still partly operated. Nevertheless, even on board of up-to-date regional 
jets, the automation has less depth of intervention than in other aircraft, as 
aviation experts confirm. In contrast, pilots of Airbus and Boeing typically 
have operated 4th generation aircraft with a high level of automation for a long-
er period. Regression analysis has already shown a positive and significant in-
fluence from perceived changing competencies on confidence in hybrid col-
laboration (.359**). 
 
Figure 11: Distribution of confidence by four factor groups of competencies 
As also shown in Figure 11, pilots who experience much change in role distri-
bution and competencies between human operators and (partly) autonomous 
technical agents mostly belong to percentile groups 3 or 4 (high or very high 
level of confidence), while all others belong to percentile group 2 (low level). 
Evidently, members of the former group can arrange themselves with the new 
mode of hybrid collaboration in the socio-technical system aircraft better than 
others. 
 (H3) Thus, our third hypothesis is supported. 
Perceived	complexity	(H4)	
Pilots’ answers are slightly below average with a mean of 3.31 (median 3.50). 
The share of pilots that perceived high (24.7%) or very high complexity 
(14.5%) is smaller than the one of those with low (33.7%) or very low com-
                                                
25 As confirmed by t-tests, the difference between regional jets and both Airbus and Boeing is 
significant, while all other tests fail. 
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plexity (26.1%), indicating a broad distribution of opinions as well as a lacking 
consensus on this issue. 
There is a strong positive correlation with experience (,228**) and age (,192**), 
indicating that older, skilled pilots do perceive more complexity than younger, 
less experienced ones. 
The following factors may help to explain these differences: 
• Older pilots may have had more opportunities to experience automa-
tion failures during their career. 
• They may have developed a more reflexive attitude towards automa-
tion-related issues, partly because they work as instructors, too. 
• Since they have experienced the change form 3rd to 4th generation jet 
airliners, their attitude towards automation may be more reserved 
compared to younger pilots who grew up in a world full of computers 
and who are used to steer advanced automated “Atari planes” without 
any prior experience with conventional aircraft. In contrast, older pilots 
may still remember the “good old times” of less automated flying and 
cockpits with a large number of analogue displays. 
 
Figure 12: Complexity and type rating 
Concerning the issue of type rating, Figure 12 demonstrates remarkable differ-
ences between Airbus pilots, belonging to percentile group 3 (high level of 
perceived complexity – median ,3511475), compared to Boeing (-,2176602) 
and regional jet pilots (-,2176602), both belonging to group 2 (low complexity), 
with surprisingly similar values. Additionally, pilots of long-range aircraft per-
ceive more complexity (,5631412) than others (-,1952689 – no figure). As con-
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firmed by t-tests, the difference between Airbus and regional jets as well as 
between long- and short-range airplanes is significant while the other tests fail. 
By combining the two dimensions “age” and “type rating”, we can gain addi-
tional insights into the issue of complexity. As Figure 13 demonstrates once 
more, younger pilots perceive less complexity than older ones, but within the 
group of younger pilots (21 to 35 years old), Airbus pilots stand out with a 
much more negative opinion compared to the other two groups (Boeing and 
regional jets), pointing to more trouble in getting accustomed to this specific 
type of aircraft during one’s first career years. 
Within the group of medium-aged pilots (36 to 50 years old), Boeing pilots 
differ from their peer group with a more positive opinion, indicating the oppo-
site, namely less concern in terms of complexity issues related to this type of 
aircraft. Although concerns are slightly higher compared to younger profes-
sionals, this may be counted as an indicator for less automation surprises and a 
well-functioning collaboration between humans and automation on board of 
Boeing aircraft compared to other types. 
 
Figure 13: Complexity, related to age (N= 80, 76, 32) and type rating 
In sum, we can clearly identify different opinions between Airbus and Boeing 
pilots concerning the issue of complexity, confirming differences between the 
automation philosophies of those two aircraft manufacturers. 
Finally, our main concern is the relation between perceived complexity and 
confidence in collaborative human-machine interaction at the flight deck. As 
shown above, the regression analysis could not reveal a relation (-.001) be-
tween those two variables. 
(H4) Hence, we have to reject our fourth hypothesis. 
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Type	rating	(H5)	
Previous analysis has already shown that type rating matters in almost any re-
gard. Pilots of regional jets perceive more symmetry and more change of com-
petencies than their colleagues on board of Airbus and Boeing aircraft. With 
regard to the issue of complexity, Airbus pilots stand out with much more 
concern in general – with remarkable differences in various groups of age. 
Regarding the central issue of confidence in hybrid collaboration, Figure 14 
presents distinct differences between pilots of regional jets belonging to per-
centile group 3 (high confidence – median ,5593656), compared to Airbus 
(-,0892897) and Boeing pilots (-,2748664), mostly belonging to group 2 (low 
confidence – confirmed by t-tests). At this point, distinctions between the de-
sign philosophies of Airbus and Boeing apparently do not show up. 
 
Figure 14: Confidence by type rating 
Regression analysis has also figured out a (weak) negative relation (-,101+), re-
futing the assertion that flying Boeing aircraft has a positive effect on pilots’ 
perceived confidence in hybrid collaboration. 
(H5) Hence, our fifth hypothesis cannot be confirmed. 
Instead of revealing differences between Airbus and Boeing aircraft, which we 
assumed referring to public and academic discourses, the analysis detected the 
relevance of range, especially in case of regional jets, which remarkably affects 
pilots’ perceptions regarding automation. This effect is much stronger than 
presumed discrepancies between Airbus and Boeing aircraft. 
Control	variable	range	
The second control variable points to the fact (frequently) mentioned above 
that it is not only the aircraft manufacturer but also the task profile and the 
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type of mission (short, medium or long range) that shape the experiences and 
thus the perceptions concerning human-machine interaction at the flight deck 
of advanced automated aircraft. As depicted in Figure 15, pilots of short-range 
aircraft are more confident (,1416048) compared to others (median -,4756400 
– confirmed by t-tests), which fits well with previous results regarding their 
positive attitudes towards symmetry and changes of competencies. 
 
Figure 15: Confidence by range 
Pilots flying short or medium distances with a high number of take-offs and 
landings and thus more opportunities to collaborate with automation obviously 
have developed a higher level of confidence compared to their colleagues on 
long distance flights. 
Control	variable	age	
As mentioned above, age matters solely in the case of perceived complexity: 
Younger pilots reported a lower level of perceived complexity than older, more 
experienced pilots. 
However, referring to confidence in hybrid collaboration, neither correlation 
nor regression analysis (.096) could reveal any relevance of age. This is surpris-
ing given the suspicion that a higher level of perceived complexity on part of 
older pilots might also affect their confidence in hybrid collaboration negative-
ly. 
However, since the variables “complexity” and “confidence” do not correlate, 
we cannot transfer findings related to perception of complexity to the issue of 
confidence. 
Figure 16 clearly demonstrates the missing relevance of age in terms of confi-
dence in human-automation collaboration at the flight deck. 
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Figure 16: Confidence by age 
5. Conclusions,	limitations	and	implications	
This paper has tried to investigate a well-known issue from a new perspective. 
Pilot surveys have been conducted frequently in the past, but they mostly have 
been guided by a traditional “either-or” perspective assuming that humans 
cannot (and should not) be replaced by automation. 
We have studied the issue of human-machine cooperation in the cockpit from 
a new viewpoint of human-machine collaboration, which has evolved during the 
last decade. Our questionnaire has been designed to find out whether collabo-
ration at the flight desk works and which are the most influential factors that 
may explain this. 
5.1. Summary	of	results	
Table 12 presents a short summary of our results. 
Univariate	analysis	
The descriptive analysis of our five constructs has revealed that most pilots 
have established a confiding relation to automation, regarding this part of the 
hybrid human-machine system as a collaborating team player (dependent vari-
able). Perceptions of symmetry, changing competencies and complexity are 
rather equally distributed among pilots, while agreement on the ultimate au-
thority is nearly unanimous. 
Can pilots still fly? 
 
37 
uni-variate multivariate bivariate 
    
assumed 
effect on 
confidence co
nf
id
en
ce
 
sy
m
m
et
ry
 
au
th
or
ity
 
co
m
pe
te
nc
ie
s 
co
m
pl
ex
ity
 
confidence high 
   
  
symmetry 
(H1) 
medium positive conf. 
authority (H2) very high negative not conf. 
competencies 
(H3) 
medium positive conf. 
complexity 
(H4) 
medium negative not conf. 
type rating 
(H5) 
  Boeing 
positive 
not conf. 
(RJets conf.) 
RJets 
pos 
. RJets 
pos 
Airbus pos 
Boeing neg 
range     neg short 
pos 
. short 
pos 
long 
pos 
age     . . . . old pos 
Table 12: Summary of results 
Multivariate	analysis	
As confirmed by the regression analysis (cf. Section 4.1), hypotheses H1 and 
H3 hold true: a high level of confidence in hybrid collaboration can be related 
both to a high level of perceived symmetry (H1) and to a high level of per-
ceived change of competencies (H3). In other words: confidence is positively 
affected by an attitude that accepts a symmetrical relation of humans and au-
tomation at the flight deck (H1) as well as the changes in role distribution, 
which have taken place during the last decades (H3) and shifted the pilots’ 
tasks from manually flying to being a manager of a complex hybrid system. 
On the contrary, hypotheses H2 and H4 have to be rejected. Neither the ad-
herence to a traditional role distribution with an ultimate authority on part of 
the human pilot (H2) nor the perception of complexity of highly automated 
aircraft (H4) has a significant negative effect on pilots’ confidence, as supposed 
by our hypotheses. Especially in case of complexity this result is rather surpris-
ing, considering the broad academic discourse on automation related problems 
in aviation (cf. Section 2.3). 
Bivariate	analysis	
Type rating, range, and – partly – age do matter, helping to better understand 
the descriptive results concerning the independent variables. Differences be-
tween Airbus and Boeing only show up in terms of complexity, not in terms of 
confidence, as supposed by our fifth hypothesis (H5), which therefore has to 
be rejected. 
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However, the most surprising result is the higher confidence among pilots of 
regional jets and short-range flights. Because of their specific task profile, they 
have got more opportunities to collaborate with automation – obviously in a 
way that shapes their attitudes positively. This positive effect can also be de-
tected to work on other variables such as “symmetry” or “competencies”. 
In contrast, age evidently is of no importance explaining attitudes towards au-
tomation. 
5.2. Limitations	
The most obvious limitation of this paper is the missing distinction between 3rd 
and 4th generation aircraft, as mentioned, due to restrictions in our question-
naire. Aircraft type, such as Boeing 737, does not allow differentiating these 
generations, e.g. 737-200 and 737-900. Further research should test other strat-
egies to investigate this generational change and its impact on pilots’ percep-
tions. Similarly, the category of regional jets should be inspected more closely. 
Finally, our analysis unfortunately has to abstain from statements concerning 
mode confusion because data do not allow deducing them. 
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